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█ Abstract Common philosophical approaches on the adequacy of emotions usually focus on the most ob-
jective assessment of the situation. In contrast to this, I claim that this objective stance, generally called 
“fittingness”, does not satisfy the current needs of emotional evaluation. Given the motivational role of 
emotions and their influence on social interactions, it is of utmost importance to also evaluate their moral 
value. Yet, a further development towards such a moral judgment is missing. In this paper, I provide an 
approach for the moral adequacy of emotional responses in a social context. I aim to show that in today’s 
social and political culture the link between emotions and moral norms cannot be neglected. Introducing 
two instances of judging the moral adequacy, I focus on evaluating either the cause or the consequence of 
an emotional reaction. By assessing the moral value of emotional responses, I think moral growth can be 
facilitated – not only in individuals but also in whole societies. 
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█ Riassunto L’adeguatezza morale delle emozioni – Usualmente gli approcci filosofici più noti circa 
l’adeguatezza delle emozioni fanno leva su una valutazione quanto più oggettiva possibile della situazione. 
Al contrario intendo suggerire che questa posizione oggettiva, solitamente denominata “fittingness”, non 
soddisfa il bisogno di valutare le emozioni. Considerato il carattere motivazionale delle emozioni e la loro 
influenza sulle interazioni sociali, è estremamente rilevante valutare anche il loro valore rispetto al giudi-
zio morale. Tuttavia, non vi sono ancora sviluppi in questa direzione. In questo articolo provo a delineare 
un approccio che descriva l’adeguatezza morale delle reazioni emotive in un contesto sociale. Il mio scopo 
è quello di mostrare che nella odierna cultura politica e sociale non si può trascurare il legame fra emozio-
ni e norme morali. Introdurrò due istanze per giudicare l’adeguatezza morale e le userò per valutare o la 
causa o la conseguenza di una reazione emotiva. Sono persuaso che determinare il valore morale delle rea-
zioni emotive possa favorire la crescita morale non solo degli individui, ma anche delle intere società. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Emozioni; Moralità; Adeguatezza delle emozioni; Norme morali; Valutazione morale 
dell’emozione 
 
 
IN THE INTERDISCIPLINARY FIELD OF emotion 
research, which progressively combines philos-
ophy with other relevant fields like psychology, 
neurobiology and sociology, a mostly philo-
sophical consideration is concerned with the 
adequacy or appropriateness of emotions. As it 
is a difficult question, when or under what cir-
cumstances an emotion is adequate to feel, the 
appropriateness is a controversial topic in the 
philosophy of emotions. 
Usually, when referring to the adequacy 
of emotions, it is agreed that there are several 
different criteria according to which one can 
judge a particular emotion. There are gener-
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ally four stances prevalent which were intro-
duced by Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacob-
son, namely epistemological justification, 
prudential reasoning, a moral perspective, 
and fittingness.1 Additionally, one might also 
include the viewpoint of emotional truth as 
established by Ronald De Sousa and further 
developed by Mikko Salmela.2 Properly dis-
tinguishing between these different criteria is 
important and necessary, as each is concerned 
with distinct qualities of the emotion at hand. 
To take the epistemic viewpoint means to 
consider whether the agent had good reasons 
for feeling the emotion, if it was, so to say, jus-
tified to emote in such a way. A prudential 
evaluation, asks for the benefit of the emotion 
for the agent, if it was good or bad for the 
agent to feel the emotion. Questioning wheth-
er it was morally right or wrong to feel the 
emotion, the moral perspective is concerned 
with the moral value of an emotion. In con-
trast, the viewpoint of fittingness asks wheth-
er an emotion was rightfully directed at its 
target, if the object or event had objectively 
sufficient properties to trigger the emotional 
response.3 Similarly, emotional truth seeks an 
objective truth value of the emotion, but, oth-
er than fittingness, it is a more specific and de-
tailed evaluative process.4 Accordingly, all of 
these criteria take different characteristics of 
an emotion into account and therefore lead to 
a different judgment. 
When it comes to deciding upon the 
overall adequacy, whether an emotion is 
judged to be either appropriate or inappro-
priate, there is no compulsory combination 
of the criteria. One could refer to one of the 
stances or a combination of all of them, de-
pending on the perspective one intends to 
take. However, in the respective literature 
there appears to be an implicit agreement 
among many to always refer to only one of 
the stances mentioned above: the viewpoint 
of fittingness – the criterion which is con-
cerned with the most objective judgment of 
the emotion, whether the emotional response 
“fits the facts” and is therefore rightfully di-
rected at its target.5  
In their paper The Moralistic Fallacy, 
D’Arms and Jacobson point out the differ-
ences between the criteria mentioned above. 
They especially emphasize the distinctness of 
fittingness from the moral judgment. But, 
they seem to implicitly favor fittingness, as 
they assume that it is the critical stance for 
the overall adequacy of an emotion and that 
it is the defining viewpoint when it comes to 
our everyday judgment of emotions.6 The 
same understanding applies to the theories of 
emotional truth described above. For in-
stance, Salmela, in his account of truth-apt 
emotions, primarily focuses on the fit be-
tween an emotion and the world whereby he 
essentially provides a developed account of 
fittingness.7 In that sense, in most approach-
es to the appropriateness of emotions, it is 
the goal to tie the adequacy of an emotional 
reaction to an objective judgment along the 
lines of fittingness.  
In the literature, this implied consent has 
led to a negligence of further development 
and interest in the other, less objective stanc-
es. Nevertheless, some concepts are question-
ing this prevalence of fittingness; they ad-
dress emotional appropriateness in terms of a 
combination of the stances mentioned above 
and emphasize the sociocultural context of 
emotions.8 But, even though there are these 
few advances, most of the criteria above re-
main unspecified. In my view, this inaction is 
a mistaken lack of interest. Especially, when 
considering that emotions are hardly ever ob-
jective phenomena, but are the bases for our 
social life and are «providing a sense of what 
[…] feels good and bad, and what feels right 
and wrong».9  
Now, when taking this into account and 
when assessing emotions in their social con-
text, it seems particularly interesting to look 
at how social and moral rules pertain to emo-
tional responses. As a result, there is an obvi-
ous need to specify an evaluation of emotions 
that does not solely ‘check for the facts’. If we 
see emotions as central to our social interac-
tions and not as solitary objective experienc-
es, there are certain social and moral stand-
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ards which apply to emotional responses, 
making them either adequate or inadequate. 
To judge emotions according to such stand-
ards is inconsistent with an objective assess-
ment in the scope of fittingness, and there 
then is a necessity for a perspective which 
takes moral standards into account. 
When looking at the effects emotions 
have on moral motivation,10 as well as the 
connections between emotions, moral values 
and moral behavior,11 a judgment along the 
lines of morality imposes itself. Even though 
it is generally accepted that emotions may be 
morally right or wrong to feel, it remains un-
answered how such an evaluation is com-
posed and what its implications are. So far, 
there seems to be no particular interest in the 
development of a moral judgment of emo-
tional adequacy.  
In contrast to the trend of neglecting mo-
rality in the judgment of emotional adequa-
cy, I propose a more detailed concept of a 
moral viewpoint and especially emphasize its 
importance and current relevance. Thereby, I 
assume that people inherently want to be 
good, or in a sense relevant here, I suppose 
that people want to emote in a socially and 
morally appropriate way. There would not be 
a significant meaning to judging anything at 
all according to moral standards if there was 
not the underlying purpose of improvement. 
The goal of improvement only makes sense, 
if there is a willingness to improve. Thus, for 
a moral judgment of emotions to be mean-
ingful, I presume that people have such a will.  
Now, since this paper is partly concerned 
with morality, one should also expect a defi-
nition of this term or at least some specifica-
tion of what is meant by it. Naturally, this is a 
rather complex topic, and an appropriate 
concept of morality is not established just 
like that. It is for that reason that I will adopt 
and settle on a folk notion of morality, a con-
cept along the lines of what Tom L. Beau-
champ and James F. Childress, among others, 
took on as “common morality”.12 According-
ly, I presume the idea of an “overlapping con-
sensus” as John Rawls puts it. An agreement 
that is present in our society and that one 
might also understand as the common sense 
of morality.13 When it comes to deciding 
what is morally right or wrong, I will always 
refer to that idea of a common sense, i.e. 
commonly shared values between all people. 
I am aware of the difficulties this brings with 
it, and, although this is a rather vague and 
inaccurate concept, I believe that it does suf-
fice the current purpose. Developing or in-
corporating an additional moral framework 
would go beyond the scope of this paper and 
may be added at a later point in more detail. 
With that in mind, I will now turn to the 
primary goal of this paper. 
At first glance, a moral judgment regarding 
all emotions might seem somewhat question-
able, especially when considering that emo-
tions are thought to arise unintentionally and 
not to be directly controllable.14 From this 
perspective, it is rather counterintuitive to 
judge emotions in the same way as one would 
do with actions. Why should people be judged 
for something that is beyond their control?  
However, emotions often are controllable 
within certain measures. And, at the end of 
this paper, we will see that morally judging 
emotions may not be so counterintuitive at 
all. In that sense, considering what I have 
touched upon before, namely the complex 
and wide influence emotions have on peo-
ple’s social life,15 I believe it is unavoidable to 
consider moral standards in regards to emo-
tions. This is particularly important when re-
specting their motivational aspects and their 
influence on a person’s actions.16 Supporting 
this, recent studies show the effects that emo-
tional reactions towards certain topics have 
on public opinion making.17 Concerning to-
day’s public and political culture,18 in which 
right-wing populists, especially in the U.S. 
and Europe, increasingly gain power by emo-
tionally charging public debates, I therefore 
suggest that it is urgently needed to evaluate 
the moral value of our emotional responses.  
In the following, I will propose an account 
of how one can judge the moral adequacy of 
emotional reactions and why this might be 
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relevant in regards to the societal develop-
ments indicated above. To do so, I will show 
the importance of the moral judgment by ex-
amining how emotions are evaluated in eve-
ryday practice. I will then explain how one 
might properly apply this judgment, and ac-
cordingly, I aim to show the purpose and rel-
evance of such a moral evaluation. 
 
█  The importance of the moral viewpoint in 
everyday life 
 
Judging the adequacy of emotions is not 
only a theoretical deliberation: In everyday 
life, people commonly judge each other’s 
emotions. This is because it is an essential 
part of interacting with others to know and 
react in accordance with their emotional re-
sponses. If one waits in a short line at the su-
permarket checkout and the person behind 
starts yelling out of anger about the long 
waiting time, one will undoubtedly wonder 
why this person shows such an inappropriate 
reaction. By evaluating the emotional re-
sponses of others, one learns something 
about those people. Someone who becomes 
furious because of a short queue at the su-
permarket is probably easy to irritate and 
should be approached with care. In that 
sense, it is normal to judge a person’s emo-
tional authenticity in order to obtain 
knowledge about her.19  
One will notice that up to this point I 
have not given a clear description of the phe-
nomena I designated as “emotions”. Howev-
er, to avoid any misconceptions or ambigui-
ties in what follows, it is necessary to be more 
explicit. To do so, I do not want to present 
anything new, but I will follow what Fabrice 
Teroni and Julien A. Deonna, among others, 
point out in accordance with the latest litera-
ture of philosophy and psychology regarding 
emotions. In that sense, when talking about 
emotions, I am concerned with affective epi-
sodes that are directed at the world. It is not 
character traits, moods, sentiments and other 
attitudes I want to address, but the emotions 
I am talking about are episodes of jealousy, 
pride, anger, happiness, disgust and so on.20  
Connecting that to the everyday judg-
ment of emotions, we may find that this 
common practice can be attributed to certain 
universal characteristics of emotions which 
are seemingly independent of the subject. As 
was just mentioned, it is commonly viewed 
that emotions are intentional, in the sense 
that they are directed at certain situations or 
objects in the world.21 More specifically, one 
might say that emotions are reactions to their 
respective targets and that they include eval-
uative presentations of the world.22 Conclud-
ing from this, emotions always have a basis in 
the matter, an intentional object: the funda-
mentum in re.23 
The everyday practice of judging emo-
tions appears to be based on precisely this 
somewhat subject-independent fundamen-
tum and seeks to answer questions about the 
correctness of the respective evaluative 
presentations. One then essentially appears 
to be asking for the fittingness of the emo-
tional reaction, i.e. if it is rightfully directed 
at its target. Consider an example: if – in an 
otherwise good partnership – one’s partner 
gets furious about not getting a good morn-
ing kiss, this is probably not regarded to be 
an adequate reaction. One would intuitively 
question the emotional response and its ap-
propriateness. In that case, the target of the 
anger, namely the missing good morning kiss, 
does not seem to be worthy of fury and the 
emotional response is not fitting. After explain-
ing the inappropriate reaction, the partner 
might later realize the incorrect emotional re-
sponse. Thus, fittingness is sufficient to indi-
cate necessary adjustments in regards to one’s 
emotional reactions. It seems to be the first in-
tuitive thing one will question if an emotional 
reaction appears to be inappropriate. 
However, there are many situations in 
which the theoretical concept of fittingness is 
not practically applicable and other criteria 
of judgment come into consideration. Take a 
similar example to the one before, suppose a 
couple with a good and working relationship. 
Now, it is their anniversary, but one partner 
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is angry. He did not receive flowers, and he 
believes that his partner forgot their anniver-
sary. What he does not know is that his part-
ner did not forget their special day and did 
send him flowers, but they got lost along the 
way. The anger is therefore unfitting, his 
partner did not forget their anniversary and 
even bought flowers, but the emotion seems 
understandable because there were good rea-
sons for him to believe that his partner forgot 
the day. In this scenario, fittingness alone is 
not a reasonable judgment and the decision 
upon the overall adequacy is difficult, as the 
two different results are competing.  
The everyday practice of judging emo-
tions is therefore not solely dependent on fit-
tingness, but it is, in fact, a combination of 
many different viewpoints. It seems that 
when judging another person’s emotional re-
sponse, one intuitively combines the differ-
ent criteria of appropriateness. When com-
bining these criteria to an overall judgment 
there sometimes appear to be competing re-
sults and the overall answer is not entirely 
clear, as in the example before. However, in 
many cases, there is an underlying hierarchy 
between the viewpoints and their respective 
results. This means that one of the stances 
will be more important than the others. To 
make this clearer, let us suppose another ex-
ample: people are laughing about a blind per-
son who walked into a lamppost in a slap-
stick-like manner. Looking at this from the 
objective stance of fittingness, it might be seen 
as a correct case of Schadenfreude: the target 
of the emotion has properties that render the 
emotional response fitting. Yet, one would still 
call the joy or amusement inappropriate; this 
is because from a moral perspective being 
happy about the misfortune of a disabled per-
son, given the context, is a wrong reaction. In 
this scenario, there again are two competing 
results to the adequacy, but there is a hierar-
chy between the stances and the moral view-
point outweighs fittingness. 
While I am not interested in the exact hi-
erarchy between the different criteria, I want 
to highlight the particular importance of the 
moral standpoint for our everyday judgment 
of emotions. It seems that once moral values 
are involved, they always significantly influ-
ence our judgment about the overall adequa-
cy of an emotional response. To emphasize 
this point, suppose a different more contro-
versial example: a policewoman working dur-
ing the well-known “refugee crisis” in Ger-
many. Imagine that during that period most 
of the cases she gets called to revolve around 
refugees. Due to her work, most of the refu-
gees she meets have been in trouble with the 
law or are involved in any kind of criminal ac-
tivities. For that reason, she developed a dis-
like for refugees in general, which eventually 
turned into what one might call “racial dis-
gust” or “hatred”. Such an emotional response 
towards refugees is clearly inappropriate and, 
presumably, most people would agree to that.  
Yet, judging this emotion from the view-
points of the different criteria, one might get 
differing results. One could argue that the 
policewoman’s racial dislike is epistemologi-
cally justified as she has good reasons for it: 
most of the refugees she knows are criminals 
and broke the law. Equally, one could say 
that there are instances of when her racial 
disgust may be fitting. When taking into ac-
count one of the functions of disgust, namely 
preventing infections and diseases by avoid-
ing contact with unknown substances, ob-
jects and individuals,24 one may find many 
situations in which the policewoman’s dis-
gust has exactly that function. Accordingly, 
being disgusted by those refugees would be a 
fitting emotional reaction in her situation. 
One could even argue on a more general lev-
el, looking at racial disgust in terms of what 
Ronald De Sousa calls “paradigm cases”,25 
cases according to which one first learns an 
emotion. In these situations, disgust is 
learned in response to a foreign, possibly 
hazardous and infectious object.26 Hence, ra-
cial disgust might serve this very function in 
the policewoman’s life, protecting her from 
potential hazards.  
Nonetheless, even though all of these re-
sults could be argued for, one would whole-
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heartedly judge racial disgust or hatred to be 
inappropriate. This is because, in the end, it 
is a morally wrong reaction - people should 
not be judged, approached or treated differ-
ently on the basis of generalized assumptions 
and experiences. This means, that although 
there are differing results to the question of 
adequacy of this emotional response, the mor-
al standpoint is the decisive one: racial disgust 
is an inadequate emotion because it is a moral-
ly wrong emotion. In contrast to the first ex-
ample of the good-morning kiss, in the two 
latter cases, there are moral values involved 
which significantly influence one’s judgment. 
Summarizing the above, it seems that the 
common everyday judgment of emotional 
adequacy is usually a combination of the dif-
ferent criteria, and sometimes these might 
lead to opposing results. But, we have seen 
that once moral norms and values are 
touched upon, the moral judgment becomes 
much more important and dominant than 
the other stances. That is to say, when it 
comes to the adequacy of an emotion in an 
everyday situation, the moral judgment 
seemingly overrules the other viewpoints. 
From this, we may conclude that the criteri-
on of morality should not be as easily disre-
garded as has been done thus far and that it is 
very relevant to judge emotions from a moral 
standpoint when it comes to emotional ade-
quacy. Having shown the general importance 
of moral values in our everyday judgment, I 
now want to develop this moral perspective 
in more detail. 
 
█  The moral adequacy of emotions 
 
Of course, it is not self-evident to con-
clude from the few examples above that the 
moral stance always overrules the other crite-
ria when it comes to emotional adequacy. It 
merely shows the importance of morality in a 
case when the other viewpoints lead to a dif-
ferent assessment. Accordingly, I do not want 
to argue that a criterion like fittingness is in-
valid or not suitable in some situations. In-
stead, I aim to show that a moral judgment of 
emotions is of high significance in regards to 
today's social and political culture. And I 
thereby want to oppose the implicit agree-
ment towards the most objective stance in 
the literature. 
When considering the complex effects 
emotions have on behavior,27 i.e. the motiva-
tional role they play for actions, and their in-
fluence on public opinions, a judgment which 
is solely asking if an emotion “fits the facts” 
does not seem to suffice for evaluating such 
intricate phenomena. When analyzing emo-
tions in their social context, almost all emo-
tions have the potential to be either morally 
adequate or morally inadequate. Since our 
social interactions are largely shaped by emo-
tions, there are certain moral values and rules 
which also apply to our emotional reactions. 
The moral judgment of those reactions then 
has the aspiration of ensuring that these 
moral norms and values are respected.  
Take the racist disgust example from be-
fore. In contrast to the other stances, the 
moral judgment is grounded on certain moral 
norms. By questioning whether those norms 
are violated, the moral judgment provides a 
basis for change and moral development in a 
specific direction. This is not to say that a 
person will all of a sudden change and adjust 
her emotional reactions, but this purely im-
plies that by morally judging an emotion one 
can facilitate the moral growth of a person.28 
In the following, the theoretical development 
of this moral judgment will help to show how 
it might be possible to apply said judgment 
when analyzing the adequacy of emotions. 
Several difficulties arise when one tries to 
morally judge all emotional responses equally. 
Not every emotion can be evaluated as straight-
forwardly as the racist disgust example in 
which the moral value of the feeling itself 
seems to be clear and rather obvious. In con-
trast, take an example of a couple where one 
of the partners is cheating. The other is furi-
ous about it and is driven by an intense feeling 
of jealousy to kill the lover of his partner. In 
this case, it is difficult to morally evaluate the 
very feeling of the emotion. Merely feeling 
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jealousy is not a morally wrong thing in itself; 
it follows, that this emotional reaction is not 
morally wrong in the same obvious way as rac-
ist disgust. Even though the very feeling of the 
emotion does not seem to be morally relevant, 
such an extreme feeling of jealousy is nonethe-
less morally inadequate due to its terrible con-
sequences. Evidently, there are different cases 
for why an emotional reaction can be morally 
relevant.  
On the one hand, there are emotions of 
which the sole feeling is already morally bad, 
and, on the other hand, there are emotions 
which have morally questionable consequenc-
es. Both of these cases – feeling an emotion 
and acting out of it – display undeniable mor-
al relevance: There is a moral value to feeling 
an emotion – e.g. racist disgust – and there is 
moral value in the following consequences of 
an emotion – e.g. killing someone out of jeal-
ousy. One cannot neglect either one, both are 
essential parts of the emotional experience 
and are equally important components of an 
emotional response.29 However, when morally 
evaluating the examples given before, racist 
disgust and killing out of jealousy, there are 
different lines of reasoning indicating their 
moral value. For the general moral adequacy 
of emotions, this naturally means that one 
needs to distinguish between such cases. The 
moral value of racial disgust has to be evaluat-
ed on a different basis than the moral value of 
the jealousy that causes someone to kill her 
partner’s lover. 
In the following section, I aim to further 
elaborate on this difference and amplify the 
idea that an emotion can be morally relevant in 
terms of two different reasons. I will show that 
in the first case it is not, as previously assumed, 
the feeling of an emotion which constitutes its 
moral relevance. And in the second case, I will 
explicate the kinds of consequences that may 
account for an emotion’s moral value. 
 
█  Appraisable causes and appraisable con-
sequences 
 
According to what was mentioned before, 
there are emotions which seem to be morally 
relevant by merely feeling them and, second-
ly, there are emotions which are morally rele-
vant due to their consequences. I will, more 
generally, refer to them as appraisable cause 
emotions and appraisable consequence emo-
tions in the following. Whereas in the latter 
case the reasons for choosing such denota-
tion are already rather obvious, the former 
term will become more clear once explained 
in the next paragraph. 
So, what exactly are these two different 
cases of morally relevant emotions? To begin 
with, appraisable cause emotions are all those 
emotions of which intuitively one would say 
that their very feeling is morally relevant, like 
the racist disgust example. Yet, this is a some-
what indefinite and unsatisfactory basis for a 
moral evaluation and is not what makes for a 
proper judgment. To make this clearer, sup-
pose the following example: A murderer is in 
jail for killing several people. He had no reason 
for killing those people and, even more, he is 
proud of his actions. It seems evident that the 
murderer’s pride is morally wrong and that one 
would condemn his emotional reaction. How-
ever, in principle pride is not necessarily a mor-
ally bad emotion and in a different scenario, 
pride might very well be morally good. Hence, 
an emotion cannot be morally wrong in itself or 
just by being a particular type of emotion. As a 
consequence, one is looking for reasons to justi-
fy a moral evaluation.  
An emotional response can never be ana-
lyzed in isolation, but it is always the agent in 
a certain context one has to take into consid-
eration. To be more explicit, the agent feels 
the emotion as a reaction towards situations 
or objects in the world, and it is his bodily 
changes eliciting that very feeling.30 An emo-
tion is then not only dependent on the agent, 
but it is the agent’s response to specific ob-
jects or events. In the beginning, I referred to 
these as the intentional objects of emotions, 
however, as these objects may be of many 
different kinds and may not be actual objects 
after all, it needs to be clarified what exactly 
an emotion is directed at.  
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Every emotion is directed at something, 
but these “things” might radically differ. One 
might be afraid of a dog, or one might be 
afraid of going to die someday. In the first 
case, the target of the emotion is a real object, 
whereas in the second case the target is an 
imaginary event. Now, while these are two 
completely different types of targets, they 
have one thing in common: they need to be 
accessible to the agent. In other words, for 
the emotion to appear, the agent needs to ei-
ther perceive the dog or imagine the event of 
dying. Both of these targets thus depend on 
another mental state to be accessible to the 
agent and to trigger an emotion. These men-
tal states are referred to as the “cognitive ba-
ses” of an emotion, and they provide the tar-
get of the emotion to the agent. The targets 
that are provided by the cognitive bases are 
then referred to as the “particular objects” of 
an emotion. We may say that an emotion is 
directed at its particular object which is itself 
provided by its cognitive bases.31 To put this 
more generally, an emotional reaction invari-
ably depends on mental states or cognitive 
processes: the cognitive bases, such as per-
ception or imagination. These bases supply 
the representations of target circumstances 
and the knowledge underlying the emotional 
reaction. In that sense, an emotion is elicited 
by such representations. One is afraid, be-
cause one perceives a dog, and one is afraid 
because one imagines dying some day.32 
At this point, it has to be mentioned again 
that emotions are reactions of an agent and 
as such, they also depend on the agent’s eval-
uations and judgments. The representations 
of the target circumstances are always evalu-
ated and judged by the agent.33 In that sense, 
these evaluations elicit an emotional re-
sponse. One is afraid of a dog, because one 
judges it as dangerous, and one is afraid of 
dying one day because one evaluates it as an 
unpleasant experience. 
From this, it follows that there is not only 
one, but there are two distinct influences on 
an emotional response: the representations 
provided by the cognitive bases and the 
agent’s evaluations regarding these.34 If one is 
afraid of a dog, one needs to perceive the dog 
and one needs to evaluate this dog to be dan-
gerous. If one is afraid of dying one day, one 
needs to imagine such a scenario and one needs 
to evaluate it as unpleasant or painful. Without 
either of these factors, the emotion would not 
occur in the first place and, therefore, together 
these influences can be said to cause a specific 
emotional reaction.35 To come back to the ini-
tial issue that an emotion cannot be morally 
wrong by merely being of a specific kind, take 
the example of the proud murderer again. Why 
is his pride morally inadequate? In light of the 
reflections above, we may justify the moral 
judgment of the emotional response by exam-
ining what caused the emotion. 
Generally, as just mentioned, one can 
identify two parts causing an emotional re-
sponse: The factor that induced the emotion, 
i.e. the representations of the target circum-
stances, and the factor that explains why the 
emotion happened, i.e. the agent's attitude 
towards these representations. Hence, one 
can describe the cause of an emotion in two 
different ways. To spell out this distinction in 
more detail we can refer to what Fred 
Dretske called the triggering and the structur-
ing causes in the context of causal explana-
tions of human behavior.36 To make this 
more clear, it will be useful to shortly sum-
marize what Dretske had in mind.  
According to Dretske, the triggering 
cause describes what actually made an event 
happen, whereas the structuring cause re-
veals why the event happened in this particu-
lar way. He gives a very general example: a 
person pressing a key on a keyboard and 
thereby making a cursor move. Dretske now 
says, there are two different explanations for 
the cursor's movement. On the one hand, it is 
the event of pressing the key that makes the 
cursor move. On the other hand, the cursor is 
moving because of the internal electrical wiring 
of the computer which explains why the cursor 
moves when pressing the key. To put it more 
generally, there is the triggering cause, namely 
the event of pressing the key which makes the 
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cursor movement happen, and there is the 
structuring cause, namely the electrical wiring 
which explains why the cursor moves. 
To clarify what exactly this means in terms 
of emotions, let us apply this concept to our 
pride example: the killer who is proud of mur-
dering several people. In this case, the trigger-
ing cause refers to the perception of the mur-
der, or, in other words, the representation of 
the target circumstances. The triggering cause 
of the pride is the perceived murder, i.e. the 
knowledge or representation the killer inter-
nally has of the actual murder. However, the 
structuring cause may not be as easily assigned. 
Why is it that the murderer is proud of this 
action, why is the emotion occurring in re-
sponse to the triggering event? To answer this, 
it is important to remember that a person’s 
emotional response always depends on the at-
titudes she has towards the event she responds 
to.37 A person will be happy about a sunny 
summers day only if she likes warm weather 
and the sun. Similarly, she will be sad about 
not seeing her family only if she deems this to 
be a bad thing. Accordingly, the murderer can 
only be proud of his action – killing several 
people – if he believes that killing someone is 
a good achievement. The structuring cause 
can hence be identified with a set of beliefs. 
The structuring cause of the pride is the set of 
beliefs that accounts for the killer’s evaluation 
of murder being an accomplishment. 
Now, let us recapitulate what I have just 
explained. When morally judging an appraisa-
ble cause emotion – an emotion which seems 
to be morally relevant by merely feeling it – 
we are judging what causes the emotion. 
Moreover, an emotion’s cause can be assessed 
in two distinct ways. Firstly, the part that in-
duced the emotion, namely the representa-
tions of the target circumstances, and, second-
ly, the part that explains the emotion, namely 
the agent’s evaluations. I referred to these two 
parts as either an emotion’s triggering cause or 
its structuring cause. Now then, when looking 
for the moral judgment of an emotion, there is 
one question that remains: Which of those 
causes is the decisive one that determines if an 
emotion is morally right or wrong? More spe-
cifically in terms of the example from before: 
Is the murderer’s pride immoral because of its 
triggering cause – the perception of killing 
several people – or is it immoral because of its 
structuring cause – the belief that killing 
someone is a good achievement?  
Suppose the same scenario, a murderer 
kills the same people without any reason. But 
this time, the murderer is not proud of his 
actions, instead, he is sad. This time, his emo-
tional reaction is not morally wrong, if any-
thing it even seems to be appropriate. Still, 
the triggering cause of the emotion is the 
same as it was before, but the moral value of 
the emotion changed. Therefore, it cannot be 
the triggering cause that determines the 
moral value of an emotion, but the moral 
value of an appraisable cause emotion de-
pends on its structuring cause.  
I briefly mentioned before that the struc-
turing cause of an emotion can fundamental-
ly be understood as a set of beliefs of the 
agent. This may not just be a single belief but 
rather a framework of beliefs, as emotional 
reactions are necessarily based on a construct 
of beliefs, desires and attitudes within the 
agent.38 This construct may then be under-
stood as the structuring cause of one’s emo-
tional reactions in the meaning relevant to a 
moral evaluation and it will be called a per-
son’s personal framework in the following. 
Once more taking up the example of the 
proud murderer, we may now find a proper 
and accurate answer for what constitutes the 
pride’s moral relevance. The moral value of 
the pride is referable to the murderer’s per-
sonal framework. This contains the immoral 
belief that killing someone is a good 
achievement and it is that attitude which is 
then the relevant cause of the emotional re-
sponse. It follows that this is the proper rea-
son for why the pride is immoral. 
So far, we looked at emotions that have 
an appraisable cause, a certain attitude or be-
lief within the personal framework, that 
deems them to be morally relevant. The oth-
er kind, appraisable consequence emotions, 
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seems harder to be evaluated from a moral 
viewpoint as it is not already their mere feel-
ing which is morally relevant. To give an ex-
ample, take the extreme case of jealousy from 
before: the agent was driven to kill her part-
ner’s lover by an immense feeling of jealousy. 
In contrast to appraisable cause emotions, in 
this scenario, no immoral attitude causes the 
emotion and accounts for the moral rele-
vance of jealousy. Prima facie, it seems as if 
this emotion may not be morally relevant at 
all. Though, when looking at the conse-
quences of the jealousy, this premature con-
clusion should be questioned. Appraisable 
consequence emotions then raise the issue in 
how far an emotion can be morally relevant 
in terms of its consequences.  
Indeed, there are few cases which are as 
clear and intuitive as the jealousy example. 
The consequences do not usually constitute 
an emotion’s moral value in the same way as 
appraisable causes do. This may become 
more clear when looking at another example: 
In recent years, there has been an increasing 
number of terroristic attacks in western 
countries and the fear of such attacks has 
grown. Fearing a terror attack is undoubtedly 
a reasonable response, similar to being afraid 
of getting hit by a car or being robbed in the 
streets. The emotion does not occur based on 
any immoral beliefs or attitudes: There is no 
morally relevant appraisable cause. However, 
the fear of terror attacks in many cases be-
came so extreme that people started discrim-
inating against Muslims or generally Arabic 
people. The fear lead to immoral behavior 
and caused people to develop questionable 
opinions about immigration. The conse-
quences of the emotion certainly have moral 
relevance. An emotional reaction, which in 
moderation is not morally relevant and maybe 
even normal, suddenly has moral implications.  
Now, it is not exactly intuitive to con-
clude that the extreme fear of terroristic at-
tacks is all of a sudden immoral just in terms 
of its consequences. Compare this to the rac-
ist disgust example from before: In this case, 
the emotion has an apparent moral value due 
to its appraisable cause, namely the preced-
ing immoral beliefs. In the fear scenario, the 
moral relevance of the emotion is not that 
accessible. Nevertheless, there are indisputa-
ble immoral consequences which follow the 
emotion. And due to these consequences, the 
extreme fear of terror attacks becomes in-
volved in a morally relevant situation. It may 
be that in contrast to the appraisable cause 
emotions we cannot simply say that the emo-
tion itself is immoral, but we may direct the 
moral judgment at the whole situation which 
was evoked by the emotion. By doing so, we 
may then transfer the moral value of the con-
sequences onto the emotion.  
This appears to be counter-intuitive and 
there are several questions which do arise: 
One might ask, why is it not just the conse-
quences which have a moral value, why 
should one involve the emotion as well? Are 
we not looking for a judgment of emotions 
and not consequences or even whole situa-
tions? To address these issues, it is of im-
portance to first clarify what exactly is meant 
by consequences, and secondly, why they do 
influence the moral value of an emotion.  
Firstly, what are the appraisable conse-
quences of an emotion? In the beginning, I 
mentioned the motivational influence of emo-
tions and I stated that it is this influence which 
leads to inevitable consequences of an emotion; 
an example of which is the extreme fear of ter-
ror attacks. Theses consequences are the result 
of emotions manifesting themselves in action 
tendencies,39 such emotional action tendencies 
then lead to certain actions or behavior.40 In 
fact, a person’s emotional actions are the out-
come of controlling and regulating their action 
tendencies.41 In that sense, action tendencies 
can be understood as programs of behavior 
which may be executed and turned into ac-
tions. Commonly, these emotional actions con-
sist of activity which aims at altering or keeping 
the state of the world in a desired way.42 But, 
emotional behavior goes much further: more 
complex emotions usually activate more com-
plex and flexible programs. These flexible pro-
grams are in turn controlled by assessing feed-
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back from actions and are guided by the aims 
and intentions of the agent.43 Emotions can, 
therefore, induce whole cascades of actions and 
they even affect the cognitive behavior of the 
agent.44 Now, all of the performed actions and 
behaviors, which are elicited by an emotion in 
the meaning just described, fall under the ap-
praisable consequences of an emotional reac-
tion. Additionally, it has to be noted that mere 
emotional expressions are also consequences of 
emotional action tendencies,45 and – even 
though emotional expressions are only a small 
subset of emotional behavior – they are there-
fore morally appraisable consequences as well.  
Secondly, why are consequences a plausi-
ble reason for judging the moral relevance of 
the emotion? We have just seen what an 
emotion’s appraisable consequences are and 
how they come about. It is the latter part 
which also explains the close connection of 
consequences and emotional reactions, and it 
is what justifies the moral judgment of an 
emotion in terms of its consequences. As I 
elaborated above, emotions reveal them-
selves in emotional action tendencies which 
inevitably lead to certain consequences. Be-
cause an emotional reaction necessarily leads 
to consequences, these consequences are by 
definition attached to the emotion. Due to 
this necessary connection, the moral value of 
the consequences in return changes the mor-
al value of the emotion. To clarify this, take 
the fear example from before. Disregarding 
all consequences, there does not seem to be 
any significant moral value to the fear of ter-
roristic attacks. But once one assesses the 
whole situation, namely the fear causing im-
moral actions as well as immoral opinions, the 
moral relevance changes. Although the fear 
does not have an obvious or even intuitive 
moral value, its moral relevance is determined 
due to the intimate connection between an 
emotion, its action tendencies and therefore 
its consequences. In that sense, an emotion 
and its consequences build a structure which is 
then subject to moral evaluation. 
It is not the aim of this paper to explain 
the proper connection of emotions and emo-
tional actions, therefore the above is only a 
rough explanation of how appraisable conse-
quences are to be understood and why they 
are genuinely connected to the emotion. Yet, 
I believe it is now clear why an emotion’s 
consequences are of importance when judg-
ing the emotion itself. Furthermore, when 
taking into account what I mentioned in the 
beginning – the impact emotions have on to-
day’s public and political culture – the signif-
icance of assessing emotions in regards to 
their consequences is evident. In terms of the 
motivational character of emotions, mani-
fested in its action tendencies, and the influ-
ence an emotion can thus have on a person’s 
actions, it can hardly be dismissed that ap-
praisable consequence emotions should be 
morally evaluated.  
At this point, it has to be mentioned that 
of course appraisable cause emotions can 
have morally wrong consequences as well, 
but once there is an underlying immoral be-
lief causing the emotion, this cause will al-
ways be the first reason for a moral judg-
ment. The consequence of an emotional re-
action is only relevant for the moral judg-
ment in terms of emotions which are not 
structured by an appraisable cause. 
 
█  The relevance of the moral adequacy 
   
So far, I presented and explained two dif-
ferent kinds of morally relevant emotions: 
emotions judged by their cause, appraisable 
cause emotions, and emotions judged in 
terms of their consequences, appraisable con-
sequence emotions. I thereby clarified the 
distinction that appeared when morally judg-
ing emotional responses. Nevertheless, there 
is still a, so to say, realm of emotional reac-
tion which I did not address yet. There are of 
course emotions which are not morally rele-
vant altogether, emotions which may not be 
usefully judged according to the criteria just 
mentioned. Even though the claim of this 
paper is that emotions should be evaluated 
from a moral viewpoint, there are of course 
many cases in which this is just not possible 
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or irrelevant. Being sad about a rainy day, be-
ing afraid of getting hit by a car or being an-
gry about missing the bus – these are emo-
tional reactions which have no moral rele-
vance. Admittedly, it is a valid concern in re-
gards to the usefulness of the moral adequacy 
of emotions that a significant number of our 
emotional reactions cannot be assessed in 
terms of morality. Such emotions may be in-
teresting to evaluate for single persons, how-
ever, it is my view that these are not the kind 
of emotions which are of interest and rele-
vance in social interactions. In the beginning, 
I introduced the necessity of a moral judg-
ment especially in terms of people’s social 
life, emotional reactions in their social con-
text and the complex settings in which they 
arise. These are the cases which touch upon 
morality due to their social impact and these 
are the cases which seem most interesting 
and rewarding to analyze. They are the emo-
tional reactions I am concerned with.  
In the beginning, I mentioned the role 
emotions play in current societal develop-
ments, especially in terms of political opinion 
making. In that sense, I explained the effect 
emotions have in a generic social context and 
that the link between emotions and moral 
norms should not be neglected. Therefore, I 
think it became clear that a moral judgment 
of emotions is necessary and of direct rele-
vance. I then aimed to explicate how this 
moral judgment can be applied to almost all 
emotions and how it can, therefore, be bene-
ficial in terms of emotional appropriateness. 
For emotions in a social context, a distinction 
between appraisable cause and consequence 
emotions is the basis of an emotional ade-
quacy relying only on morality. In accord-
ance with that distinction, in this final part, I 
want to emphasize the relevance of morally 
judging emotions. With the understanding of 
how and why emotions can be morally right 
or wrong to feel, there seem to be certain im-
plications for the general judgment of emo-
tions. By morally judging a person’s emotional 
reactions, the social environment of a person 
not only seems to have an impact on her emo-
tional behavior but also on her beliefs and atti-
tudes. Accordingly, in the following, I will ex-
plain what the moral adequacy of emotions 
brings with it in regards to social feedback. As 
it is the nature of any moral judgment to de-
mand improvement, it is the same in terms of 
the moral adequacy of emotions. In that sense, 
judging both, appraisable cause and appraisa-
ble consequence emotions, has the ambition 
to influence the emoter positively.  
On the one hand, appraisable cause emo-
tions give access to a person’s system of be-
liefs and desires, their personal framework 
underlying her emotional responses. If an 
emotional reaction is deemed morally wrong, 
this might lead to questioning one’s own be-
liefs and desires. Of course, the respective 
emotion has to be visibly expressed in some 
way, otherwise, an external judgment would 
not be possible. Take again the rather bold 
example of the murderer who is proud of his 
actions. Judging his pride to be morally 
wrong – which may just be by external reper-
cussions – might make him realize that kill-
ing someone is not a good achievement at all. 
Murder is not something one should be 
proud of, and his initial belief should thereaf-
ter be adjusted. At this point, it is important 
to note that the moral value of an emotional 
reaction is not indicated by its triggering 
cause, but by the moral relevance of its struc-
turing cause. It is, therefore, the structuring 
cause, namely the personal framework, which 
deems the pride to be morally bad. As I men-
tioned before, condemning such an emotion-
al response then does not lead to the conclu-
sion that murder is bad, but it indicates an 
immoral personal framework. Indeed, this 
does not suppose that a person will all of a 
sudden change her personal framework, but 
it should instead be understood as a process: 
Learning to include moral values and norms 
into one’s personal framework by judging the 
respective emotional reactions, i.e. emotional 
reactions with an appraisable cause.  
It seems that the example of the proud 
murderer is a bit cumbersome, yet, it is an 
excellent example to support the preceding 
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argumentation. But to make this final point 
clearer, take the relevant example of racial 
disgust which I also introduced before. By 
actively judging this emotional reaction to be 
morally wrong, the emoter gets the feedback 
that his personal framework needs to be ad-
justed. The particular beliefs, which give rea-
sons for the disgust, are morally questionable 
and need to be reconsidered, i.e. abandoned. 
This will not happen in an instant, but it will 
occur over time and it will occur over many 
responses that indicate an unjust personal 
framework. In that sense, morally judging an 
appraisable cause emotion is a tool for de-
tecting immoral beliefs. 
On the other hand, appraisable conse-
quence emotions indicate a need for emo-
tional regulation and also indicate question-
able beliefs in the agent’s personal frame-
work. I explained before that emotional ac-
tions are essentially the result of regulated 
emotional action tendencies.46 From this, it 
follows that appropriate regulation can influ-
ence, shape and change the consequences of 
an emotion. If the consequences of an emo-
tion are morally wrong, the emotional reac-
tion should have better been regulated. As a 
matter of fact, learning and changing one’s 
emotional regulatory abilities is not just im-
aginable, but emotional regulation is mostly 
adapted and learned in accordance with the 
social surroundings during emotional devel-
opment, thus during childhood and adoles-
cence.47 It is therefore rather clear that mor-
ally judging emotional reactions during this 
phase will improve regulatory abilities in a 
way that moral values and norms are respect-
ed. However, even in adult life, a person will 
adjust her emotional regulatory abilities ac-
cording to social influences.48 It follows that, 
throughout all stages of life, a moral judg-
ment of emotional responses will facilitate 
moral norms and values. Suppose once more 
the case of extreme jealousy in which the 
emotion leads to the killing of the partner’s 
lover. It is clear that this emotional reaction 
should have been adjusted in order to pre-
vent its consequence. Therefore, morally 
judging the jealousy might improve the 
agent’s regulatory abilities. Emotional reac-
tions which become problematic when not 
properly regulated can then be avoided by 
adjusting one’s emotional regulation.  
However, the behavior following an emo-
tion is not only shaped by one’s regulatory 
abilities, but also by one’s personal frame-
work. I explained before that emotional be-
havior is guided by aims and intentions. These 
attitudes are part of a person’s personal 
framework and are conversely influenced by 
social encouragement and approval of her 
emotional actions.49 Consequently, emotional 
behavior partly depends on a person’s person-
al framework which is shaped by social influ-
ences. When judging appraisable consequence 
emotions within their morally relevant con-
text, a person’s regulatory abilities, as well as 
her personal framework, are evaluated.  
To make this more conclusive, consider 
again the example of fearing terror attacks. 
The extreme fear led to immoral actions, be-
havior and opinions. By judging these conse-
quences, we may find that, on the one hand, 
there is a need for better emotional regula-
tion. If being afraid of a terror attack leads to 
discriminating behavior, e.g. treating Mus-
lims differently, the fear should probably be 
better controlled. On the other hand, if the 
fear leads to an overall immoral opinion, e.g. 
how to treat refugees, there is a need for 
reevaluating one’s personal framework. This 
is because such a shift is not only induced by 
the emotion, but it also depends on other 
underlying attitudes, e.g. strong beliefs about 
specific topics. In the end, as mentioned 
above, emotional behavior is not only affect-
ed by emotional regulation, but also by a per-
son’s personal framework. 
Of course, by condemning appraisable 
consequence emotions in their relevant con-
text, there will be no sudden improvement 
and change in a person’s regulatory abilities 
and personal framework. However, both, 
emotional regulation and the personal frame-
work are guiding emotional behavior and are 
affected by social approval. In that sense, so-
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cial repercussions towards appraisable conse-
quence emotions can guide regulatory behav-
ior and alter beliefs in one’s personal frame-
work. Bearing that in mind, a moral judgment 
of the respective emotional responses needs to 
happen over some time. Only then can regula-
tion be learned, adopted and finally exerted, 
and only then can the beliefs within a personal 
framework be affected. 
Finally, I want to address one last con-
cern. When comparing appraisable cause 
emotions with appraisable consequence emo-
tions and how their moral relevance comes 
about, one might see similarities and ques-
tion the independence of appraisable conse-
quence emotions. The objection may be that 
for appraisable consequence emotions, it is 
also the cause of the emotion which deems its 
moral relevance and not its consequences. It 
seems that in both cases the personal frame-
work of a person largely affects the emotions. 
One might ask, whether it is not a belief or 
attitude causing the appraisable consequence 
emotion to be immoral. 
Now, there is a crucial difference which 
has to be stressed. Let us suppose the two dif-
ferent examples of racial disgust and the fear 
of terror attacks. In the case of racial disgust, 
there is a distinct set of beliefs which causes 
the emotion, we referred to this as the emo-
tion’s structuring cause. At the point of feel-
ing the emotion, this cause ensures the moral 
value of the disgust. It is for that reason that 
the racial disgust has a clear moral value, 
which we may intuitively ascribe. In contrast, 
this is not the case with fearing terror at-
tacks. This time, there is no structuring cause 
which indicates a moral value. At the point of 
feeling the emotion, there is no obvious or 
intuitive moral relevance. Fear of a terror at-
tack is perfectly natural. The moral value is 
determined afterward, in terms of the emo-
tion’s consequences, namely immoral actions 
and opinions induced by the fear. Indeed, the 
fear then does not possess a clear-cut moral 
value which is comparable to racial disgust. 
But it is due to the crucial connection be-
tween an emotion and its consequences that 
one cannot neglect the moral relevance of 
appraisable consequence emotions. 
 
█  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I demonstrated that an 
emotion can be morally relevant in terms of 
either its cause or its consequences and that 
these appraisable causes or appraisable conse-
quences determine the moral value of an 
emotional response. Appraisable cause emo-
tions are evaluated on the basis of their struc-
turing cause, namely a person’s personal 
framework underlying her emotional re-
sponses. Appraisable consequence emotions 
are judged in regards to their consequences, 
that is emotional behavior following an emo-
tion’s action tendencies.  
Subsequently, I pointed out that evaluat-
ing the moral adequacy of emotions provides 
the possibility to facilitate moral growth. 
Judging appraisable cause emotions pushes 
for incorporation of moral values into a per-
son’s framework, i.e. her system of beliefs, 
desires and attitudes. Whereas, judging ap-
praisable consequence emotions contributes 
to the adjustment of the personal framework, 
as well as the improvement of a person’s 
emotional regulatory abilities. By adjusting 
her personal framework in accordance with 
moral values, a person will also have to assess 
her emotionalized opinions. 
Therefore, public debates which are often 
shaped by such opinions might be subject to 
moral evaluations by prior judgment of emo-
tions. Modifying and improving emotional 
regulation might eventually reduce emotion-
ally charged actions and behavior of all sorts. 
In the end, by considering the moral adequa-
cy of emotional reactions, it might be possi-
ble to encourage moral norms in today’s soci-
ety which is shaped by exploiting people’s 
emotions. 
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